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FEDERALISM IN ACTION: 
FDA REGULATORY PREEMPTION IN 
PHARMACEUTICAL CASES 
IN STATE VERSUS FEDERAL COURTS 
Catherine M. Sharkey*
INTRODUCTION 
Federal preemption of state tort law unequivocally alters the 
balance between federal and state power. In this hotly contested 
field, all would agree that “[t]he extent to which a federal statute 
displaces (or preempts) state law affects both the substantive 
legal rules under which we live and the distribution of authority 
between the states and the federal government.”1 Courts and 
academics have, accordingly, widely discussed and debated the 
federalism implications of preemption.2 But the discussion has, 
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. For helpful 
suggestions and comments, I thank Michael Dorf, Samuel Issacharoff, Gillian 
Metzger, Burt Neuborne, Gil Seinfeld, Cass Sunstein, and Amanda Tyler. 
Jaime Sneider provided superb research assistance. 
1 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225-26 (2000); Viet 
D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2117 
(2000) (characterizing the Supreme Court’s preemption analysis as an effort 
to redefine “the proper balance of legislative powers between Congress and 
the states”). 
2 For a sampling of the rich academic literature, see Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 471 (2002) (“Whereas one might expect pro-
federalism Justices to disfavor claims of federal preemption of state law, 
substantive conservatism may help to explain why the Court has so frequently 
upheld preemption claims in recent years.”); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine 
M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1353, 1357 
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to date, overlooked what I shall term “federalism in action”: 
whether, and why, state and federal judges adopt divergent 
approaches to the same interpretive exercise.3
Federal preemption of state tort law in the products liability 
realm is a particularly suitable context for this exploration 
because state and federal judges are routinely called upon to 
interpret the same federal statute and products liability trials that 
take place roughly equally in state and federal courts.4 The 
(2006) (“Rather than standing as an ally of state autonomy against the 
encroachments of the federal behemoth . . . the Court appears to be a willing 
partner of Congress in providing federal oversight to state interference with 
the national market.”); Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 
53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 508 (2002) (“[T]he failure of the Court to apply 
preemption doctrine sparingly, and with real attention both to Congress’s 
intent and the values of federalism, will in the long run prove disastrous 
to . . . the very real values . . . inherent in federalism.”); Daniel J. Meltzer, 
The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 S. CT. REV. 343, 368-69 
(remarking upon the “contrast . . . between the approach taken by individual 
Justices in preemption cases and the approach that the same Justices take to 
issues of constitutional federalism”); and Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist 
Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 131 (2004) (“Doctrines 
limiting federal preemption of state law thus go straight to the heart of the 
reasons why we care about federalism in the first place.”). 
3 A notable recent exception is Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and 
the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1501 (2006), which 
emphasizes that “how courts ought to interpret federal statutes is not only a 
‘horizontal’ question of the separation of powers between federal courts and 
Congress, but also a ‘vertical’ question of the proper relationship between 
Congress and state courts—in other words, a federalism question.” Id. at 
1503; id. (“State courts play an important, often independent, role in the 
interpretation of federal statutes. Accordingly, the question of how they ought 
to interpret federal statutes should figure prominently in federal statutory 
interpretation debates.”). 
4 While a mere 9 percent of tort jury trials are litigated in federal district 
courts, “[a]lmost half of product liability trials (46 percent) that reached a 
verdict in 1992, 1996, and 2001 were handled by the federal courts.” 
Thomas C. Cohen, Do Federal and State Courts Differ in How They Handle 
Civil Trial Litigation: A Portrait of Civil Trials in State and Federal District 
Courts 17 (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=912691) [hereinafter Cohen, Civil Trial Litigation]. Moreover, 
“[i]n comparison to the state courts, products liability jury trials occurred 
more frequently in the federal courts.” Id. at 8 (reporting that roughly 22 
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alleged parity between state and federal courts has been 
vigorously debated in the context of the enforcement of federal 
constitutional rights.5 Thus far, however, the realm of federal 
percent of federal tort jury trials involved products liability issues as 
compared to less than 5 percent of state tort trials). Defendants are active in 
seeking removal in products cases. According to Cohen, in his sample of 584 
non-asbestos products liability trials in federal district court, 35 percent 
originated in state court and were removed to federal court. Email from 
Thomas Cohen, Statistician, Bureau of Justice Statistics, to Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School (Apr. 16, 2007) (on file 
with author). See also Theodore Eisenberg & Trevor Morrison, Overlooked 
in the Tort Reform Debate: The Growth of Erroneous Removal, 2 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 551 (2005) (depicting an increasing trend of 
defendants removing diversity cases from state to federal court). 
5 See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
1105, 1119-20 (1977) (arguing that “given the institutional differences 
between the two benches, state trial judges are less likely to resolve arguable 
issues in favor of protecting federal constitutional rights than are their federal 
brethren”); Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of 
Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797, 799 (1995) (“I continue to believe that 
a relative institutional advantage for the plaintiff exists in federal court; an 
advantage resulting from a mix of political insulation, tradition, better 
resources and superior professional competence.”); Michael Wells, Behind 
the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of 
Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 644 (1991) (citing a “systematic 
disparity between federal and state court judges”). 
 Empirical studies have attempted to reassert the parity claim and debunk 
the competing disparity one. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking 
Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 383 (1991) (concluding, 
based upon review of 114 Section 1983 cases, that federal and state courts 
provide substantially the same likelihood of relief and evidence a comparable 
comprehension of federal law); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, 
Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 
10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983) (concluding that sample of more than 
1,000 federal district court and state appellate court decisions evidences parity 
in the treatment of First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and equal 
protection claims). See also William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 
16 CONST. COMMENT 599, 599 (1999) (challenging parity and Neuborne’s 
thesis in concluding based on personal experience as a civil liberties litigator 
that “gay litigants seeking to establish and vindicate civil rights have 
generally fared better in state courts than they have in federal courts”). Not 
only have the methodology and conclusions of these individual studies been 
assailed, see, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. REV. 
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statutory interpretation has evaded similar scrutiny.6
651 (1991), but the entire empirical enterprise has come under withering 
attack as either politically manipulable given the lack of objective measures 
or else entirely beside the point, see, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the 
Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1991) (proposing a litigation choice 
model whereby plaintiffs have the choice of a state or federal forum); Martin 
H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A 
Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 329 (1988) (defending an abstention doctrine that puts the onus on 
Congress to determine when federal jurisdiction is desirable and appropriate). 
See also Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, State Court Protection of 
Federal Constitutional Rights, 12 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 127 (1989) 
(responding to criticisms of their original empirical study). 
6 This Essay, then, merely scratches the surface of what may prove a 
fertile area of comprehensive study. Indeed, a cursory review of recent 
preemption cases before the U.S. Supreme Court provides anecdotal support 
for the existence of a more widespread preemption disparity thesis. Take, for 
example, the case that reached the U.S Supreme Court in 2005 as Bates v. 
Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005). The federal circuits were 
virtually unanimous in holding that FIFRA preempted state tort claims, while 
a few outlier state courts had rejected preemption. Compare, e.g., King v. 
E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1993); Hawkins v. 
Leslie’s Pool Mart, Inc., 184 F.3d 244, 246 (3d Cir. 1999); Worm v. Am. 
Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744, 748 (4th Cir. 1993); Dow Agrosciences LLC v. 
Bates, 332 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2003); Kuiper v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 960 F. 
Supp. 1378 (7th Cir. 1997); Hardlin v. BASF Corp., 397 F.3d 1082 (8th 
Cir. 2005); Natham Kimmel, Inc. v. DowElanco, 275 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 
2002); Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 
981 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir.1993); Oken v. Monsanto Co., 371 F.3d 
1312, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2004), with e.g., Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 834 
S.W.2d 136, 141 (Ark. 1992) (“[S]tate common law tort claims for 
inadequate labeling are neither expressly nor impliedly preempted by 
FIFRA.”); Dow Chemical Co. v. Ebling ex rel. Ebling 753 N.E.2d 633, 636 
(Ind. 2001) (“FIFRA does not preempt the plaintiffs’ failure to warn 
claims . . . .”); Sleath v. West Mont Home Health Services, Inc., 16 P.3d 
1042, 1053 (Mont. 2000) (same); Brown v. Chas. H. Lilly Co., 985 P.2d 
846, 853 (Or. App. 1999) (same). See also Geier v. American Honda Motor 
Co., 529 U.S. 861, 866 (2000) (“All of the Federal Circuit Courts that have 
considered the question . . . have found pre-emption[,]” whereas “[s]everal 
state courts have held to the contrary.”); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 
505 U.S. 504, 508-09 & n. 2-3 (1992) (noting split in authority between 
several federal courts of appeals, which had held that federal cigarette 
labeling statutes preempted state law claims, and two state supreme courts, 
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In this Essay, I focus on the divergent approaches of state 
and federal courts in deciding whether the Federal Food Drug 
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),7 and accompanying regulations 
promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
preempt state failure to warn claims brought against 
pharmaceutical companies. Intuitively, one might expect state 
court judges to be comparatively hostile to claims of federal 
incursions onto their state law turf. In fact, a recent empirical 
study of nearly 300 products liability preemption cases revealed 
that “federal courts are considerably more likely to find 
preemption than are state courts.”8 This result fits the 
which held to the contrary that the federal statutes did not preempt similar 
common law claims). 
 In similar fashion, the Court’s certiorari grant in Watters v. Wachovia 
Bank, N.A..,127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007), a regulatory preemption case last Term, 
took many by surprise, given the consensus for preemption in the lower 
federal courts. 431 F.3d 556, 560-63 (6th Cir. 2005) (case below) (holding 
that state attempts to regulate the operating subsidiaries of national banks are 
preempted by the National Bank Act and Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency regulations). See National City Bank of Indiana v. Turnbaugh, 463 
F.3d 325, 331-34 (4th Cir. 2006); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 
305, 315-16 (2d Cir. 2005); Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 
949, 962-67 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, all but one state signed onto a brief 
in opposition to preemption of the claims in Watters. Brief of the States of 
New York et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, Watters v. 
Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 05-1342 (Sept. 1, 2006), 2006 WL 2570992. 
7 Pub. L. No.75-171, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938); Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 
Stat. 781 (1962) (Kefauver-Harris Amendment); Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-115. 
8 Keith N. Hylton, Preemption and Products Liability: A Positive Theory 
20 (Aug. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=433661). Hylton reports that “[o]f the total claims, 
federal courts found 61 percent preempted while state courts found 42 percent 
preempted.” Id. The comparative statistics are even more dramatic in the 
subset of failure to warn claims. Id. (“For failure to warn claims, federal 
court preemption rate is 74 percent, while the state court preemption rate is 
53 percent, which is statistically significant at the conventional five percent 
level.”). 
 In making any comparisons of preemption rates across state and federal 
courts, however, one must be cognizant of potential selection bias—namely, 
that products cases are not distributed randomly between state and federal 
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“widespread perception among attorneys, litigants, and 
policymakers that defendants are provided with more favorable 
forums than plaintiffs in the federal courts,”9 and the 
corresponding observation that “much of the complex personal 
injury and commercial litigation arising under state law is routed 
into the federal courts by the corporate bar desirous of obtaining 
the technical advantages which federal trial courts are perceived 
to enjoy over their state counterparts.”10
This conventional explanation of the state-federal disparity 
overlooks two salient factors, which are at the heart of the FDA 
drug labeling preemption debate and the main focus of this 
Essay. First, the recurrent debate—in the academy and the 
courts—regarding the interplay between federal regulations and 
state common law tort actions has, in less than a decade, 
radically shifted from regulatory compliance to federal 
preemption. If state courts have an institutional interest in 
courts and may therefore differ in kind. 
9 Cohen, supra note 4, at 2. Subjecting this widely held perception to 
empirical analysis, Cohen’s study finds that “[o]verall, the rates in which 
plaintiffs won at trial were nearly equal in both the state and federal court 
systems.” Id. at 9. A marked disparity does, however, emerge in the realm 
of products liability: “In state courts, plaintiffs prevailed in 38 percent of 
product liability jury trials and in federal courts, the plaintiff success rate was 
30 percent.” Id. at 10. 
10 Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, supra note 5, at 1130 n.88. See also 
Stephen Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil 
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. 
STUD. 591 (2004) (suggesting pro-defendant bias in that federal courts are 
more likely than state courts to grant summary judgment or to dismiss a 
case); Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 4 (demonstrating increasing trend of 
defendants’ efforts to remove cases from state to federal court). A further 
pro-defendant bias operating at the federal appellate level is discussed in 
Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti Plaintiff Bias in the Federal 
Appellate Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128 (2001-02) and Theodore Eisenberg, 
Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further 
Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 
659 (2004). For a critical take on this research, see Harry T. Edwards & 
Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers (And Unsupported Claims of Judicial 
Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (2002) (characterizing Eisenberg’s conclusion 
as “specious,” his reasoning as “flawed,” and his empirical research as 
“deficient”). 
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preserving the autonomy of state common law from broad 
federal overrides, then presumably one should expect the same 
resistance to claims of outright preemption. Perhaps most 
striking, then, is not the fact that federal courts’ enthusiasm for 
preemption outpaces state courts, but the fact that preemption 
has gained any traction whatsoever in state courts, which by and 
large have previously rejected any absolute regulatory 
compliance defense. If state courts are now willing to entertain 
preemption arguments, even if not at the same level as federal 
courts’ affinity for such claims, then the simple turf-guarding 
story has to be treated with some suspicion. 
Second, a myopic institutional focus on the courts alone 
misses the critical role and influence of federal agencies. In our 
modern regulatory state, federal agencies have assumed a 
dominant role in statutory interpretation.11 For instance, in 
2006, the FDA promulgated a regulation governing the format 
and content of prescription drug labels.12 In a preamble to the 
regulation, the FDA set forth its belief that the federal regulation 
trumped competing state regulatory and common law.13 Such 
aggressive maneuvering by the FDA (and other federal agencies) 
on the preemption front has sparked considerable debate.14 In 
the post-preamble world, state and federal courts have been 
faced with vexing questions raised by the clash of two 
competing canons of interpretation: the presumption against 
preemption in areas of traditional state purview and the 
mandatory Chevron deference accorded to agency interpretations 
11 See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES at 153 (book 
manuscript) (forthcoming 2007) (“[M]ost statutory interpretations today are 
administrative ones . . . .”). 
12 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human 
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan. 24, 
2006) (effective date June 30, 2006). 
13 Id. at 3934 (“[U]nder existing pre-emption principles, FDA approval 
of labeling under the act . . . preempts conflicting or contrary State law.”). 
14 See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal 
Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007) 
(characterizing the trend of federal agencies’ issuance of preambles into their 
regulations that purport to preempt conflicting or contrary state law as a form 
of backdoor federalization of products liability). 
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of ambiguous statutes.15 What has thus far been overlooked is 
the extent to which federal agencies’ role and influence may be 
a driving force behind the state-federal disparity in preemption 
determinations. In the realm of FDA prescription drug 
preemption, not only are federal courts more likely to defer to 
federal agencies, but—equally important in terms of explaining 
the decision-making process of courts—federal courts are more 
likely than state courts to solicit the views of the FDA and the 
FDA is more apt to intervene on its own in federal court cases. 
This Essay proceeds in three parts. The first two explore 
what I have identified as two salient features that might explain 
divergent approaches of state and federal courts to the FDA 
drug labeling preemption analysis: (1) the radical shift in the 
debate from regulatory compliance to preemption; and (2) the 
role and influence of the FDA. I conclude with some thoughts 
regarding the federalism implications of state-federal court 
differences in approach to the preemption inquiry. 
I.  THE SHIFT FROM REGULATORY COMPLIANCE DEFENSE TO 
FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
In 2000, the Georgetown Law Journal published a seminal 
symposium issue on the regulatory compliance defense.16 The 
volume was a culmination of the fervent interest in the 
15 The U.S. Supreme Court had an opportunity last Term to provide 
some further guidance on the interplay between the presumption against 
preemption and Chevron deference in the Watters case. See supra note 6. The 
majority, however, took the position that the deference issue was “beside the 
point, for under our interpretation of the statute, the level of deference owed 
to the regulation is an academic question.” 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572 (2007). 
Compare id. n.13 (“Because we hold that the [National Banking Act] itself—
independent of OCC’s regulation—preempts the application of pertinent 
[state] laws to national bank operating subsidiaries, we need not consider the 
dissent’s lengthy discourse on the dangers of vesting preemptive authority in 
administrative agencies.”), with id. at 1585 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Whatever the Court says, this is a case about an administrative agency’s 
power to preempt state laws.”). 
16 Symposium, Regulatory Compliance as a Defense to Products 
Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000). 
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regulatory compliance defense on the part of academics, 
policymakers, courts and legislatures over the last quarter of the 
20th century. In the early 1990s, the American Law Institute, as 
part of its Reporter’s Study on Enterprise Responsibility for 
Personal Injury, weighed in with a regulatory compliance 
proposal based on the principle that supplementing 
administrative regulation with tort produces unreasonably high 
transaction costs in manufacturing and inconsistent risk-benefit 
analysis.17 Notwithstanding the ALI’s endorsement, the 
regulatory compliance defense ultimately amounted to a 
conceptual broadside that failed to take root in the case law. 
Now, federal preemption of state tort liability has replaced 
regulatory compliance as a dominant issue for the 21st century. 
Preemption’s grip on scholars is evinced by the recent series of 
law review symposia convened on the subject.18 A prominent 
conservative think-tank, the American Enterprise Institute in 
Washington, D.C., has deemed regulatory preemption a central 
theme of its “Federalism Project.”19 Aggressive agency 
17 See, e.g., 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTER’S STUDY, 
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY (1991) (proposing a 
limited regulatory compliance defense on the grounds that supplementing 
administrative regulation with tort produces unreasonably high transaction 
costs in manufacturing and inconsistent risk-benefit analysis). 
18 Symposium, Ordering State-Federal Relations Through Federal 
Preemption Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007); Symposium, 
Federal Preemption of State Tort Law: The Problem of Medical Drugs and 
Devices, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (2005). See also Richard Nagareda, FDA 
Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L. 
(2006), available at http://www.bepress.com/jtl; Richard A. Epstein, Why 
the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference and 
a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT L. (2006), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/jtl. 
19 American Enterprise Institute, Federal Preemption: Law, Economics, 
Politics, available at http://www.federalismproject.org/preemption (“The AEI 
Federalism Project conducts and sponsors original research on American 
federalism, with particular emphasis on federal and state business regulation, 
legal developments and the role of the courts, and the prospects for 
rehabilitating a constitutional federalism that puts states in competition for 
productive citizens and businesses.”). Scholarly papers generated from the 
conference hosted by AEI were published in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ 
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maneuvers, like the FDA’s issuance of its preemption preamble, 
has stoked even further interest in the subject.20
The shift from regulatory compliance to federal preemption 
is, at first glance, somewhat perplexing given that the latter is, 
in essence, a blunter instrument than the former, which on the 
whole failed to gain traction in jurisdictions across the country. 
Certainly the United States Supreme Court has played an 
influential role here. In the watershed 1992 case of Cipollone v. 
Liggett Group,21 a divided Court signaled a willingness to set 
aside state common law in the name of federal objectives, 
leading to an upsurge in the use of preemption as a defense in 
products cases.22 In this section, I propose that state court 
judges, influenced by legislative and common law hostility 
toward the regulatory compliance defense, would tend to be 
more predisposed against preemption arguments than federal 
court judges, conditioned to see the last decade or so of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s products liability preemption through a wider 
preemption jurisprudence lens. 
A.  Regulatory Compliance Defense in State Courts 
It is hardly an exaggeration to claim that the push for a 
strong regulatory compliance defense to tort liability—in the 
POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve 
eds.) (2007). 
20 See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 14, at 229-42 (discussing recent spate 
of preemption preambles issued by FDA, NHTSA, and CPSC). The 
Department of Homeland Security is one of the latest agencies to announce a 
rule indicating its belief that agency regulations impliedly preempt state law. 
See 71 Fed. Reg. 78276 (Dec. 28, 2006) (“The Department is particularly 
concerned that a conflict or potential conflict between an approved Site 
Security Plan and state regulatory efforts could create ambiguity that would 
delay or compromise implementation of security measures at a facility.”). 
21 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
22 Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as 
the Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 904 
(1996) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in [Cipollone] . . . triggered a 
notable upsurge in the successful use of preemption as a defense to products 
liability lawsuits.”). 
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pharmaceutical context, immunizing drug manufacturers from 
liability where they have met or exceeded federal standards—
advocated by a host of scholars and policymakers has been an 
abject failure.23 Today, Michigan stands alone in having 
adopted, by statute, blanket immunity based upon federal 
regulatory compliance.24 Several additional states (Colorado, 
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, New Jersey, Tennessee, Texas, and 
Utah) provide weaker protection in the form of a rebuttable 
presumption that FDA-approved warnings are adequate in the 
23 See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, The Case For a “Strong” Regulatory 
Compliance Defense, 55 MD. L. REV. 1210, 1212 (1996) (“[M]ost courts 
allow juries to take compliance with regulatory standards into account, but 
steadfastly refuse to treat federal safety standards as anything more than 
minimum standards.”); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, 
Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 320 (1990) (“[F]or reasons that we find difficult to 
understand, courts have not deferred to the determinations of product safety 
agencies. . . . The analysis usually begins and ends with the statement that 
agency standards are minimum, not maximum, standards and that courts are 
therefore free to disregard them.”). 
24 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5) (2007) (“In a product 
liability action against a manufacturer or seller, a product that is a drug is not 
defective or unreasonably dangerous, and the manufacturer or seller is not 
liable, if the drug was approved for safety and efficacy by the United States 
food and drug administration, and the drug and its labeling were in 
compliance with the United States food and drug administration’s approval at 
the time the drug left the control of the manufacturer or seller.”). Michigan’s 
immunity provision, moreover, is under attack. See, e.g., Michelle Miron, 
Local Leaders Fear Change to Drug-suit Law, KALAMAZOO GAZETTE (March 
2, 2007) (describing “proposed changes in a law [passed by the Michigan 
House and headed for the Senate] that makes it nearly impossible for 
Michigan citizens to sue drug companies when prescription drugs cause death 
or injury”), available at http://www.mlive.com/news/kzgazette/index.ssf?/ 
base/news22/1172852630246550.xml&coll=7. Several states (Arizona, 
Colorado, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, and Utah) provide more limited 
immunity from punitive damages where the FDA has approved warnings. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-
302.5(5)(a) (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(c) (West 2000); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2307.80(c)(1) (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927(1)(a) (2003); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2(1) (2002). 
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face of failure to warn claims.25 But a strong super-majority of 
state jurisdictions stands opposed to the regulatory compliance 
defense; the conventional view is that regulatory compliance is 
simply one factor to be taken into account in tort actions.26
Debate over the regulatory compliance defense—in general, 
and as applied specifically to pharmaceuticals—has occupied 
scholars for the better part of the last quarter century. Some 
deplore courts’ rejection of the defense and sustained use of 
common law remedies even in areas where specific conduct is 
regulated—especially with respect to failure to warn claims.27 As 
25 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(1) (2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-
20-5-1 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a) (1995 & Supp. 2004); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (West 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-
104; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3). For statutory provisions targeted 
specifically at FDA-approved warnings, see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
403(1)(b) (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 2000); TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.007 (Vernon 2005). 
26 See, e.g., Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1365 (Cal. 1996) 
(“The manufacturer’s compliance with product safety statutes or regulations 
such as those of the FDA would also be relevant, but not necessarily 
controlling.”); Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 63 (N.M. 
1995) (“[E]vidence of compliance with applicable regulations, is relevant to 
whether the manufacturer was negligent or whether the product poses an 
unreasonable risk of injury, but that such evidence should not conclusively 
demonstrate whether the manufacturer was negligent or the product was 
defective.”). See generally JAMES A. HENDERSON & AARON D. TWERSKI, 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 293 (5th ed. 2004) (“Several 
states treat compliance with statute as a presumption of non-
defectiveness. . . . However, decisions have indicated a judicial unwillingness 
to apply these presumptions with any bite.”). 
 Some states go beyond rejecting the regulatory compliance defense by 
cabining defendants’ ability to make a state of the art defense. See, e.g., 
Feldman v. Lederele Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 388 (N.J. 1984) (“[T]he 
defendant should properly bear the burden of proving that the information 
was not reasonably available or obtainable and that it therefore lacked actual 
or constructive knowledge of the defect.”). As James Henderson and Aaron 
Twerski observed, “[g]iven that defendants are unlikely to carry the burden 
of proving a negative, the modified New Jersey rule may be the functional 
equivalent of true strict liability.” Henderson & Twerski, supra note 23, at 
275. 
27 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical Innovation, 
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one commentator notes, “a defendant often will have printed on 
the label of its product the exact words of a warning mandated 
by statute and in the particular size and manner statutorily 
required for the specific type of product sold.”28 That “courts 
have freely imposed common law tort liability on defendants in 
compliance with the relevant [warning] statute” is all the “more 
troubling” in the related context of design defect.29
The troubling aspects are (at least) twofold. One set of 
objections, highlighted by David Geiger and Mark Rosen, 
contends that tort liability, subsequent to FDA drug approval, 
constitutes “retrospective jury nullification” of FDA regulations 
and “is contrary to public policy.”30 A separate line of attack 
advocated by Kip Viscusi (among others), is that tort liability is, 
at best, useless and, at worst, counterproductive in terms of 
ensuring safer drugs.31
8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1139, 1151 (1987) (“What is needed . . . is a rule that 
provides that certain warnings approved by, say, the FDA shall be 
conclusively regarded as adequate in any subsequent lawsuit.”); James A. 
Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for Defective Product Design: A 
Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. REV. 625, 639 (1978); Peter Huber, 
Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the 
Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985). 
28 Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort 
Actions, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 200 (1989). 
29 Id. 
30 David R. Geiger & Mark D. Rosen, Rationalizing Product Liability 
for Prescription Drugs: Implied Preemption, Federal Common Law, and 
Other Paths to Uniform Pharmaceutical Safety Standards, 45 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 395, 397 (1996). 
31 W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: 
An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1437, 1480 (1994) (“Tort law in the pharmaceutical 
context has proven to be an extraordinarily expensive regime that suffers 
from institutional constraints limiting its accuracy. . . . [W]here the 
manufacturer has complied with the FDCA and its implementing regulations, 
tort law does not appear to have significant ability to generate safer drugs.”); 
W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social 
Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and 
Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65 (1989). See also Epstein, supra note 18 
(“What possible reason is there not to preempt [pharmaceutical] litigation 
which on balance is worse than useless?”). 
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Others extol the virtues of common law liability even in the 
face of regulatory compliance.32 Robert Rabin, for example, 
upholds as “counterweights to a regulatory expertise model . . . 
claims for respecting state autonomy, for attending the 
nonefficiency goals such as compensation, for acknowledging 
dynamic social utility goals such as monitoring the ethics of 
business practices, and for recognizing the often unanticipated 
circumstances under which risks come to fruition.”33 According 
to Rabin, two key features of the tort system—its role “as an 
information-generating mechanism and as a compensatory 
system”—“suggest its complementary characteristics to 
regulation.”34 The crux of the debate boils down to whether 
agencies, such as the FDA, promulgate minimum or optimal 
safety standards.35 As Rabin remarks, “no serious commentator 
would argue for a regulatory compliance defense in 
circumstances where the agency regulations are regarded as 
minimum safety standards rather than optimal standards.”36  
FDA-approved drugs may provide one of the strongest cases 
for the regulatory compliance defense,37 given that the FDA sets 
32 See, e.g., Michael D. Green & William B. Schultz, Tort Law 
Deference to FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 88 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2123 
(2000) (“[A] regulatory compliance defense for pharmaceuticals is not nearly 
as scalpel-sharp as some, who ignore the details, have led us to believe.”). 
33 Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 
2049, 2084 (2000). 
34 Id. at 2061. 
35 See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1333 (Or. 
1978) (Linde, J., concurring) (“The role of such [regulatory] compliance 
should logically depend on whether the goal to be achieved by the particular 
government standards, the balance struck between safety and its costs, has 
been set higher or lower than that set by the rules governing the producer’s 
civil liability. It may well be that when government intervenes in the product 
market to set safety standards, it often confines itself to demanding only 
minimum safeguards against the most flagrant hazards, well below the 
contemporary standards for civil liability. But that . . . is not necessarily so 
for all products today.”), reh’g denied, 579 P.2d 1287 (Or. 1978). 
36 Rabin, supra note 33, at 2074. 
37 This point is conceded even by those who argue against the regulatory 
compliance defense. See, e.g., id. (“[M]any scholars have regarded FDA 
licensure of new prescription drugs as the strong case for the regulatory 
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optimal standards, employs scientific experts, and regulates 
products highly valued in the market.38 Nonetheless, courts and 
commentators continue to refer to the new drug application 
process as minimum standards setting. And this view has held 
particular sway in the state courts. As soon as one appreciates 
the centrality of the minimum standards view to courts’ rejection 
of the regulatory compliance defense,39 hostility toward federal 
preemption by force of such a minimum regulatory standard of 
common law failure to warn claims seems foretold.40
compliance defense for a number of reasons.”); Green & Schultz, supra note 
32, at 2122 (“[T]he FDA sets optimal standards—or at least better than any 
other entity that exists.”). 
38 Given the stringency of its ex ante regulation, the FDA might merit a 
greater degree of deference than other agencies. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, 
Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE 
L.J. 2580, 2596 (2006) (“Perhaps some institutions (the SEC? the White 
House itself?) deserve more respect than others (the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission? the Bureau of Immigration Affairs?); the real world 
of judicial review undoubtedly reflects different levels of deference to 
different agencies.”). 
39 See, e.g., Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 933 P.2d 298, 302 (Okla. 1997) 
(“It is the widely held view that the FDA sets minimum standards for drug 
manufacturers as to design and warnings. We conclude that compliance with 
these minimum standards does not necessarily complete the manufacturer’s 
duty.”); Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 931 (Kan. 1990) 
(“[R]egulations imposed by the FDA are minimal standards. A drug company 
is not prohibited from providing additional warnings and additional 
information that is not required by the FDA.”); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & 
Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973) (“[M]ere compliance with regulations or 
directives as to warnings, such as those issued by the United States Food and 
Drug Administration here, may not be sufficient to immunize the 
manufacturer or supplier of the drug from liability.”).
40 See, e.g., Bell v. Lollar, 791 N.E.2d 849, 855 (Ind. App. 2003) 
(“The FDA’s requirement that a generic drug have the same labeling as the 
pioneer drug is a minimum standard.”); Levine v. Wyeth, __ A.2d ___, 2006 
WL 3041078, at ¶61 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2006) (Reiber, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
majority in the instant case . . . viewed the federal regulation as setting a 
minimum safety standard that states were free to supplement or strengthen.”); 
Kurer v. Parke, Davis & Co., 679 N.W.2d 867, 874 (Wis. App. 2004) 
(“[T]his Court is right to interpret the FDA standards as minimum 
ones . . . .”).
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B.  Products Liability Preemption in the Supreme Court 
Torts cases are not what come to mind when one 
contemplates the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
particularly on the superheated topic of federalism. But there is 
a burgeoning coterie of products liability preemption cases of 
fairly recent vintage that has captured the Court’s attention.41 
The 1992 Cipollone case marks the genesis of these cases, with 
its key holding that the threat of tort liability and damages, as 
much as statutory or regulatory standards, governs primary 
conduct.42 Geier v. America Honda Motor Co.,43 the next 
seminal case regarding federal preemption of state tort law, 
stands for the proposition that Congress’ inclusion of a “savings 
clause” in a statute, preserving common law liability, does not 
thwart the operation of the principles of implied conflict 
preemption.44
Keep in mind that, prior to Cipollone, defendants rarely 
pressed preemption arguments in products cases45 and that, at 
the time of the Georgetown Law Journal symposium issue on the 
regulatory compliance defense, Geier was yet to be decided. The 
point is that there have been significant developments in the 
41 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Supreme 
Court Preemption: The Contested Middle Ground of Products Liability, in 
FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note 19, at 194-216. 
42 See, e.g., Noah, supra note 22, at 906 (“In the decade before 
Cipollone, the Court expressed a marked reluctance to find preemption of 
common-law tort claims, but its decisions from the last several Terms suggest 
a significant reversal in this attitude.”). 
43 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
44 Id. at 869 (“We . . . conclude that the savings clause (like the express 
pre-emption provision) does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-
emption principles. Nothing in the language of the savings clause suggests an 
intent to save state-law tort actions that conflict with federal regulations.”). 
45 DAVID OWEN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY 383 (4th ed. 
2004) (“Until the early 1990s, manufacturers had virtually abandoned the 
preemption argument, for it had been routinely rejected by most courts in 
most contexts for many years. . . . [T]he Supreme Court in 1992 infused the 
preemption doctrine with new power, and it is now a frequent issue in 
modern products liability litigation.”). 
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Court’s preemption jurisprudence in the recent past that may go 
a long way toward explaining the radical shift in the debate from 
regulatory compliance to preemption. I want to suggest, perhaps 
provocatively, that these developments may have affected federal 
and state court judges in subtly different ways. To be clear, I 
am not intimating that state court judges act in defiance of 
federal law, nor indeed that they are incapable of understanding 
or applying federal preemption jurisprudence. The difference is 
far more nuanced. 
I want to draw upon Burt Neuborne’s classic arguments in 
The Myth of Parity for state versus federal differences in 
constitutional litigation. Neuborne pressed the view that “[w]hen 
the mandates of the Federal Constitution are clear, most state 
court judges respect the supremacy clause and enforce them. 
Constitutional litigation, however, is rarely about clear law.”46 
The same admonition applies in spades to preemption 
jurisprudence—notoriously described as a “muddle.”47 Here, as 
in the realm of constitutional litigation, “federal courts are more 
responsive than state courts to Supreme Court commands.”48 As 
Neuborne stated, 
federal judges often display an enhanced sense of 
bureaucratic receptivity to the pronouncements of the 
Supreme Court. State judges, of course, almost 
always recognize that they too are bound not to 
disregard the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Federal Constitution. Their bureaucratic relationship 
with the Supreme Court is, however, more attenuated 
than that of a district court judge.49
Moreover, and perhaps even more striking in the statutory 
realm of preemption, 
federal judges appear to recognize an affirmative 
46 Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, supra note 5, at 1119. 
47 Nelson, supra note 1, at 232; see also Dinh, supra note 1, at 2085 
(“[T]he Supreme Court’s numerous preemption cases follow no predictable 
jurisprudential or analytical pattern.”). 
48 Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, supra note 5, at 1121 n.59. 
49 Id. at 1124. 
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obligation to carry out and even anticipate the 
direction of the Supreme Court. Many state judges, 
on the other hand, appear to acknowledge only an 
obligation not to disobey clearly established law.50
Given these similarities, Neuborne’s disparity thesis might have 
traction in the realm of preemption, or statutory interpretation 
more generally. 
It would not be too far of a stretch to suggest that state 
courts, by hewing closely to prior precedents rejecting the 
regulatory compliance defense, steer clear of flouting any 
“clearly established” Supreme Court law. State court judges, as 
creatures of state government, moreover, may be subtly 
predisposed to rely on state law.51 Indeed, this predilection is 
50 Id. at 1124-25; see also Bellia, supra note 3, at 1553 (criticizing 
federal courts’ creative interpretation of statutes, arguing that “for inferior 
federal courts strategically to make federal law in forward-looking ways in 
statutory interpretation would deny the law so made the characteristic of 
being ‘the supreme Law of the Land.’ The Supremacy Clause’s 
characterization of federal law as the ‘supreme Law of the Land,’ fairly 
implies that at an appropriate level of generality federal law should have a 
uniform meaning in any state or federal court.”); id. at 1556 (“[N]one of this 
is to deny the reality that different courts give different interpretations to the 
same statute in materially similar contexts.”). 
51 See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the ‘Passive Virtues’: 
Rethinking The Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1901 (2001) 
(“[State judges] frequently have had legislative experience, participate to 
some degree in the lawmaking process, and in some states, stand for 
election”); Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in Governance: 
Vive La Différence!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273, 1286 (2005) (“Elective 
state courts are, however, more likely to have some members with prior 
legislative experience than the Supreme Court . . . . In the smaller state 
capitals, if not in California or New York, judges and legislators are more 
likely to meet informally as well as in official collaborations on law 
reforms.”). See also THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 38 BOOK OF 
THE STATES 253 (2006) (indicating that the state legislatures are vested with 
the power to appoint state judges in South Carolina and Virginia). 
 The dynamic is surely more complicated, however, than a familiarity and 
loyalty towards state law. Electoral politics may play a large role in 
influencing partisan-elected judges. See, e.g., Anthony Champagne, Tort 
Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1483 (2005) 
(demonstrating ongoing battle, especially in partisan election states, for 
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borne out in the sample of state court decisions involving the 
preemptive effect of FDA labeling. The state court decisions 
rely predominantly (and sometimes exclusively) on prior state 
law precedents (mostly involving rejection of the regulatory 
compliance defense).52
Furthermore, while the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
on implied preemption in the products realm is far from 
pellucid, a majority of the state court cases fail to cite the 
relevant precedents (such as Geier or Sprietsma v. Mercury 
Maine53).54 The difference between the paradigmatic state court 
approach and that of some federal courts, which read the pro-
preemption directional force of Supreme Court precedents as in 
Geier as support for a highly deferential view toward regulatory 
preemption, is unmistakable.55
control of state supreme courts). In particular, the relative strengths of the 
plaintiffs’ bar versus the pharmaceutical lobby may affect elected state court 
judges’ preemption proclivities. 
52 See, e.g., Abramowitz v. Cephalon, Inc., 2006 WL 560639, at *4 
(N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. Mar. 3, 2006) (citing R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 745 
A.2d 1174 (N.J. 2000)); Bell v. Lollar, 791 N.E.2d 849, 852 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2003) (citing Rogers ex rel. Rogers v. Cosco, Inc., 737 N.E.2d 1158 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2000)); Coutu v. Tracy, 2006 WL 1314261, at *2 (R.I. Super. May 
11, 2006) (citing Verizon New England, Inc. v. R.I. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 
822 A.2d 187, 192 (R.I. 2003)); Kurer v. Parke, Davis & Co., 679 N.W.2d 
867, 875 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 592 A.2d 
1176 (N.J. 1991)). 
53 537 U.S. 51 (2002). 
54 See Abramowitz, 2006 WL 560639; Bell, 91 N.E.2d 849; Coutu, 2006 
WL 1314261; Kurer, 679 N.W.2d 867. 
55 E.g., Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518 (E.D. Pa. 
2006) (“Fundamentally, a series of Supreme Court decisions point this Court 
in the direction of deference, and require dismissal of this case.”); id. at 524 
(“Geier is the most recent in a consistent, long line of cases that articulate the 
Supreme Court’s principles on implied preemption.”), appeal docketed, No. 
06-3107 (3d Cir. 2006). See also In re Bextra and Celebrex Marketing Sales 
Practices and Prod. Liab. Litig., 2006 WL 2374742 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 
2006); Dusek v. Pfizer Inc., 2004 WL 2191804 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2004); 
Needleman v. Pfizer Inc., 2004 WL 1773697 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2004). 
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II.  THE KEY INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 
FDA influence in prescription drug labeling cases reached a 
high-water mark in 2006. In a preamble to a new rule governing 
the form and content of prescription drug labels, the FDA stated 
its view that the new regulations preempt competing state law 
regulatory or common law claims. The FDA was emphatic that 
state law decisions that reject the preemptive authority of FDA 
labeling “rely on and propagate interpretations of the Act and 
FDA regulations that conflict with the agency’s own 
interpretations and frustrate the agency’s implementation of its 
statutory mandate.”56 It remains to be seen whether the 2006 
preamble, which represents a formal statement by the expert 
federal agency charged with regulating prescription drug labels57 
as to the preemptive effect of its determinations, will alter the 
general reluctance on the part of courts—both state and federal—
to find wholesale preemption of personal injury claims in drug 
cases.58
Here, I focus on a slightly different issue, namely whether 
we should expect state and federal courts to differ in their 
respective responses to the FDA’s influence and role. My 
prediction is that federal courts will continue to be more likely 
to solicit the views of the FDA in the cases before them, and 
that the FDA will be more likely to intervene on its own in 
56 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human 
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 n.7 
(Jan. 24, 2006) (effective date June 30, 2006). 
57 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(B). 
58 As I have explained in more detail elsewhere,  
[c]ourts’ approaches to the preemption question run the gamut 
between what I would call two extreme, or absolutist, positions. 
At one end (the staunch “anti-preemption” pole), courts wield 
the “presumption against preemption” statutory canon to fend 
off even the more compelling preemption arguments. At the 
opposite “pro-preemption” pole, courts have accorded Chevron 
deference to the FDA’s preamble position, cutting a wide 
preemptive path. 
Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional 
Approach 37 (2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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federal cases. Each of these developments, in turn, should lead 
to greater deference on the part of federal courts toward the 
agency’s view. 
Already, a sense of a stark disparity between federal and 
state court approaches to the preemptive effect of the FDA 
preamble emerges from the early cases. Consider, as one 
example, Colacicco v. Apotex,59 the first federal court decision 
to grapple with the preemptive effect of the FDA preamble. In 
Colacicco, the husband of a woman who committed suicide after 
having taken a generic form of the anti-depressant drug Paxil 
(one of the class of drugs knows as SSRIs, or selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors), sued the generic drug manufacturer 
(Apotex) and the manufacturer of Paxil (GlaxoSmithKline) for 
failure to warn of an increased risk of suicide.60
The court called upon the FDA to file an amicus brief to 
explain the legal effect of the recently promulgated preemption 
preamble.61 Answering the court’s call,62 the FDA filed an 
59 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006), appeal docketed, No. 06-3107 
(3d Cir. 2006). 
60 Id. at 519-20. 
61 Id. at 519. 
62 Brief of Amicus Curiae The United States of America, Colacicco v. 
Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (No. 05-CV-05500-
MMB) [hereinafter U.S. Colacicco Br.]. 
 The FDA (via the Department of Justice) submitted amicus briefs in 
three prior (pre-preamble) SSRI cases. See Corrected Amicus Brief for the 
United States, Kallas v. Pfizer, No. 04-00998 (D. Utah Sept. 29, 2005) 
[hereinafter U.S. Kallas Br.]; Amicus Brief for the United States in Support 
of Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, and in Favor of Reversal of the 
District Court’s Order Denying Partial Summary Judgment to Defendant-
Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498) [hereinafter U.S. Motus Br.]; Brief of the 
United States of America, In re Paxil Litig., 218 F.R.D. 242 (C.D. Cal. 
2003) (No. CV 01-07937 MRP) [hereinafter U.S. Paxil Br.]. Kallas was 
settled soon after the FDA filed its amicus brief in the case. Notice of 
Settlement, Kallas v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2:04-cv-998 (D. Utah filed Oct. 13, 
2005). In Motus, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment on causation grounds, without reaching 
the merits of the preemption defense. Motus, 358 F.3d 659, 660 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
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amicus brief to elaborate upon the preamble, which “sets out 
[the] FDA’s current understanding of the way in which state tort 
judgment can interfere with the FDA’s implementation of federal 
law.”63
The FDA emphasized that its requirements for prescription 
drug labels set both the “ceiling and a floor.” In other words, 
according to the FDA, it sets optimal, as opposed to minimal, 
safety standards.64 To justify its stance, the FDA further 
explained that “[i]n considering the agency’s views on drug 
labeling, it is critical to understand, where warnings are 
concerned, more is not always better.”65 According to the FDA, 
in the context of prescription drugs, overwarning is a risk every 
bit as serious as underwarning. To address the precise regulatory 
issue before the court, the FDA explained that it had considered 
and rejected adding warnings discussing the potential between 
suicide and the use of SSRIs.66 Having weighed in on the 
precise risk of suicide, the FDA urged that “it would stymie the 
regulatory scheme established by Congress to hold as a matter of 
state law that the defendants are liable for failing to provide” a 
warning that had been rejected by the FDA.67
The views espoused by the FDA in its amicus brief proved 
central to the federal district court’s holding that the FDCA and 
63 U.S. Colacicco Br., supra note 62, at 18. 
64 Specifically, the FDA’s aim is “to encourage the optimal level of use 
in light of reasonable safety concerns, by requiring scientific evidence of an 
association between a drug and a particular hazard before warning of that 
association on a drug’s labeling.” Id. at 14. 
65 Id. at 13. See also U.S. Kallas Br., supra note 62, at 28. 
66 U.S. Colacicco Br., supra note 62, at 7-11. 
67 Id. at 16. See also U.S. Kallas Br., supra note 62, at 39-40 (“FDA’s 
accomplishment of its responsibilities would be disrupted and undermined if, 
driven in part by concerns about later state law tort liability, drug 
manufacturers were to engage in their own labeling determinations by adding 
warnings that, in FDA’s judgment, were not based on reasonable scientific 
evidence of an association or causation.”); U.S. Motus Br., supra note 62, at 
14-15 (“[I]mposition of liability on the basis of a failure to warn would 
thwart the FDCA’s objectives of ensuring a drug’s optimal use by requiring 
that the manufacturers disseminate only truthful information as to its 
effects.”). 
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FDA regulation preempted the plaintiff’s state tort failure to 
warn claims against both the generic and brand name drug 
companies.68 Indeed, the court specifically acknowledged that 
“the FDA’s view is critical to this Court’s analysis because 
Supreme Court precedent dictates that an agency’s interpretation 
of the statute and regulations it administers is entitled to 
deference.”69 Moreover, the court continued, “it is not the 
function of this Court, or for a jury empanelled to decide this 
case, to substitute its judgment for the FDA’s about these 
medical issues.”70
If the Colacicco court represents one endpoint on the 
spectrum of respect and deference accorded the FDA preemption 
preamble, at the opposite pole one finds this state court’s view: 
The preamble, as I see it, is a political statement by 
the FDA. The primary purpose of it is to criticize 
state courts and to set forth the FDA’s position that—
not to criticize state courts so much as to set forth the 
FDA’s position that they believe there should be 
federal preemption of all tort actions. . . . What the 
preamble is saying is the FDA should be the final 
word.71
Suffice it to say that here, New Jersey Superior Court Judge 
Carol E. Higbee, in a hearing in a Vioxx case pending before 
her, not only rejected the preemption defense, but eschewed any 
68 Colacicco v. Apotex, 432 F. Supp. 2d 574, 536 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
69 Id. at 525 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). The court was emphatic that “pre-
emptive intent may properly be communicated in amicus briefs, preambles, 
and interpretive statements.” Id. at 530. The court’s view that the FDA’s 
preamble warrants Chevron deference is controversial. See infra notes 92-96 
and accompanying text. 
70 Colacicco, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 530. 
71 Doherty v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. ATL-L-638-05-MT (N.J. Super. 
June 9, 2006). The case ended with a defense verdict in July 2006. Id. (July 
13, 2006). The Vioxx cases in New Jersey state court were coordinated 
before the Honorable Carol E. Higbee. Recently, in another of these Vioxx 
cases before Judge Higbee, plaintiff won a jury verdict, awarding $20 million 
in compensatory damages and $27.5 million in punitive damages. Humeston 
v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. ATL-L-2272-03 (N.J. Super. March 12, 2007). 
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reliance whatsoever on the FDA preamble by defendant Merck. 
Nor is Judge Higbee’s position anomalous. In Levine v. 
Wyeth,72 the Vermont Supreme Court embraced the same 
emphatic view that “the FDA’s statement deserves no 
deference.”73 And, in direct contravention of the FDA’s 
expressed view, the court held that the FDCA established a 
floor, not a ceiling, for safety standards. According to the court, 
in the context of prescription drugs, common law tort standards 
always complement federal regulation. Almost by definition, 
then, state tort liability would not frustrate federal objectives or 
conflict with federal law.74
While federal and state court decisions run the gamut from 
pro- to anti-preemption in the prescription drug context, the type 
of hostility towards the FDA embodied in these state court 
opinions finds no parallel in the federal court decisions. For a 
variety of reasons, state courts may be less deferential towards 
federal agencies. First, the nearly wholesale rejection of the 
regulatory compliance defense by state courts (discussed above) 
may “reflect a populist faith in laypersons and an accompanying 
distrust of distant federal bureaucracies.”75 Second, state courts’ 
attitude towards federal agencies might bear some relationship to 
their attitude towards state agencies (and state agencies’ 
interpretations of state law).76
72 _ A.2d _, 2006 WL 3041078 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2006). 
73 Id. at ¶32 (“Nothing in the FDA’s new statement alters our conclusion 
that it would be possible for defendant to comply with both its federal 
obligations and the obligations of state common law.”). Nor did the court 
countenance any of the FDA’s previously filed amicus briefs, see supra note 
62. 
74 2006 WL 3041078, at ¶6. 
75 Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of 
Symmetry in Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2153 (2000). 
76 But this is an open question, as scholars have found it difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify any overarching pattern of state courts’ deference to 
state agencies’ interpretation of state law. See William R. Anderson, Chevron 
in the States: An Assessment and a Proposal, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 1017, 1018 
(2006) (describing the “problems of indeterminacy and confusion” of 
deference principles at the state level “because of the variety and diversity of 
state development of the pertinent doctrinal considerations”); Sunstein, supra 
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A.  Agency Involvement 
On the whole, the FDA is far more active in the federal 
courts than in the state courts. Federal courts have actively 
requested the participation of the FDA in several key cases. 
Before issuance of the preamble, the FDA obliged the federal 
courts’ requests in Bernhardt v. Pfizer, Inc.77 (a New York 
federal district court), In re Paxil Litigation78 (a California 
federal district court), and Kallas v. Pfizer, Inc.79 (a Utah 
federal district court). In addition, the FDA intervened on its 
own initiative by filing an amicus brief in Motus v. Pfizer, Inc.80 
(the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).81 Post-preamble, federal 
note 38, at 2597 n.79 (noting “[t]he difference between the Chevron approach 
and the contrasting approach of several state courts”). 
 A further complication is state courts’ treatment of federal agencies and 
their interpretations of federal law. Even state courts that generally accord 
deference to state agencies might nonetheless resist the idea of Chevron 
deference to federal agencies on separation of powers grounds. But see infra 
note 101 (noting the converse situation, whereby state courts that, as a 
general matter, reject deference to state agencies’ interpretation of state law, 
nonetheless accord Chevron deference to at least one federal agency, the 
FDA). 
77 Statement of Interest of the United States, Bernhardt v. Pfizer, Inc., 
2000 WL 1738645 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2000) (Nos. 00-Civ-4042 LMM, 00-
Civ.-4379 LMM). The FDA’s statement of interest contended, “[B]oth 
modifications to approved product labeling and the issuance of labeling in the 
form of warning letters—intrudes upon the FDA’s role and is preempted.” Id. 
at 2. The court ultimately avoided the question of preemption, on the ground 
that the FDA had primary jurisdiction. Id. at 1. 
78 218 F.R.D. 242 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (No. CV 01-07937 MRP). The 
FDA filed a statement of interest arguing that “courts . . . should regard 
FDA’s actions as preemptive of state law.” U.S. Paxil Br., supra note 62, at 
6; id. (“[T]he Court should consider Plaintiffs’ purportedly state-law based 
injunctive request preempted by federal law.”). 
79 No. 2:04CV0998 (D. Utah Sept. 29, 2005). 
80 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-cv-55372, 02-civ-55498). 
81 Agencies may submit amicus briefs to either federal or state courts 
when the United States has a “substantial interest” in the proceedings. 28 
U.S.C. § 517 (2007) (“The Solicitor General, or any officer of the 
Department of Justice, may be sent by the Attorney General to any State or 
district in the United States to attend to the interests of the United States in a 
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courts have asked for the FDA’s views in Colacicco v. Apotex82 
(discussed above) and Perry v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp.83 
(both Pennsylvania federal district court, the former now 
pending in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals). In all, the FDA 
has been directly involved in roughly one quarter of the federal 
court decisions since 2000.84 In sharp contrast, no state court 
has asked the FDA to submit its views in a pending case.85 The 
FDA intervened, on its own initiative, in a single state case in a 
California appellate court, Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham 
Consumer Healthcare L.P.86
suit pending in a court of the United States, or in a court of a State, or to 
attend to any other interest of the United States.”). 
82 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006), appeal docketed, No. 06-3107 
(3d Cir. 2006). 
83 456 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Pa. 2006). At the court’s request, the 
FDA submitted a letter brief that equivocated on the ultimate preemption 
question. Letter of the United States to Judge Dalzell, Perry, 456 F. Supp. 
2d 678 (filed Oct. 12, 2006) (“[I]t is not possible to decide as a matter of law 
whether liability on the plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claim would prevent the 
accomplishment of federal regulatory objectives.”). 
84 The sample of state and federal cases (listed in the Appendix) is drawn 
from Westlaw searches of litigated cases, supplemented with a few settled 
cases mentioned in the briefs of litigated cases and unpublished orders from 
an electronic case notification service. The sample includes 22 federal cases 
that have considered the preemptive effect of drug labeling regulations. 
85 Here, state courts have neither acted sua sponte, nor on prompting by 
the parties. See, e.g., Motion for Reargument Defendant-Appellant at 1, 11, 
Levine v. Wyeth, 2006 WL 3041078 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2006) (No. 670-12-01) 
(“The Court should seek FDA’s views on its own regulation”), reh’g denied, 
No. 2004-384 (filed Dec. 11, 2006) (“Insofar as appellant has failed to 
demonstrate that the Court overlooked or misapprehended points of law or 
fact that would have affected the result, the motion is denied.”). 
86 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (No. A094460), rev’d, 88 
P.3d 1 (2004). The FDA’s intervention in Dowhal might be explained by the 
fact that, prior to the litigation, the California Attorney General had solicited 
the FDA’s opinion in order to decide whether to initiate an enforcement 
action against the drug manufacturer. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the United 
States of America in Support of Defendants/Respondents Smithkline Beecham 
Consumer Healthcare LP, et al. at 15-16, Dowhal, 88 P.3d 1 (No. S109306). 
 In the sample of cases (listed in the Appendix), there have been seven 
state cases concerning the preemptive effect of drug labeling, so all told, the 
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Moreover, this difference in the frequency with which the 
FDA files amicus briefs in federal versus state court litigation is 
a very conservative measure of the disparity in agency influence 
for the simple reason that federal courts are also more likely 
than state courts to rely on FDA amicus briefs filed in prior 
cases. For example, in three federal cases involving products 
liability claims associated with the use of anti-depressant SSRIs, 
the courts explicitly relied upon amicus briefs filed by the FDA 
in earlier cases, urging preemption of claims relating to the 
same class of drugs.87 In Weiss v. Fujisawa Pharmaceutical 
Co.,88 another recent case involving a failure to warn claim 
against the manufacturer of the drug Elidel, the federal district 
court relied explicitly on the letter brief the FDA had previously 
submitted in Perry v. Novartis—again, because the same drug 
was at issue.89 Taking into account reliance on previously 
submitted FDA briefs, federal courts explicitly consider the 
FDA’s views in nearly one of every two cases.90
FDA is roughly twice as likely to participate in federal (versus state) 
litigation. 
87 Ackermann v. Wyeth Pharms., 2006 WL 2591078, at *5 (E.D. Tex. 
Sept. 8, 2006) (“Wyeth has also provided recent decisions, as well as briefs 
submitted by the FDA, which clearly demonstrate that at least the FDA views 
its labeling requirements as preemptive to any other state rule or regulation.”) 
(magistrate report and recommendation), withdrawn, 2006 WL 3780913 
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2006); Dusek v. Pfizer, Inc., 2004 WL 2191804, at *4 
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2004) (referencing the Motus brief, the court held, 
“Supreme Court precedent dictates that the FDA’s position as stated in its 
amicus brief is entitled to some deference”); Needleman v. Pfizer, Inc., 2004 
WL 1773697, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2004) (“More compelling is the 
amicus brief submitted by the government in Motus. There, the United States 
plainly concluded that ‘any warning, no matter how worded, that could 
reasonably have been read as describing or alluding to such a relation 
[between Zoloft and suicide] would have been false or misleading, and 
therefore in conflict with federal law because there was no (and still is not) 
scientific support for such a warning.’”).
88 464 F. Supp. 2d 666, 674 (E.D. Ky. 2006). 
89 Id. at 674 (“[T]his Court finds that the approach taken by the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania [in Perry v. Novartis Pharm.] 
is persuasive.”). 
90 There is no similar reliance phenomenon in the state court decisions. 
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FDA intervention in individual cases is by no means a 
perfectly accurate measure of agency influence. Two caveats 
bear mentioning. First, it is important to keep in mind that the 
preemption preamble was part of a strategy aimed at relieving 
the burden on the FDA to intervene in individual cases.91 The 
preemption preamble, in other words, may, at least in part, 
substitute for direct agency involvement case by case. Second, 
agency involvement is by no means tantamount to influence. It is 
necessary, but by no means sufficient, for a court to be apprised 
of the FDA’s position before it can be swayed by it. We turn 
next to examine deference to agency position—whether 
embodied in an amicus brief or else the newly promulgated 
preemption preamble. 
B.  Deference to Agency Position 
Judicial deference to the FDA’s position on preemption has 
been controversial since the FDA first articulated that position in 
2000. The recent preemption preamble has simply ratcheted up 
the debate. Technically, the preamble is a regulatory advisory 
opinion.92 The nub of the controversy is whether it is 
appropriate to defer to an agency statement in a preamble. Those 
in the affirmative camp draw support from Justice Stephen 
Breyer’s concurrence in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,93 which cast a 
wide net for relevant sources of preemptive intent: “‘regulations, 
preambles, interpretive statements, and responses to comments,’ 
as well as through the exercise of its explicitly designed power 
A couple caveats are relevant here. First, none of the state cases involved 
SSRIs or Elidel, which could partially explain the nonreliance. Second, 
roughly half of the state cases (four out of seven) were decided after passage 
of the FDA preemption preamble, which might be taken by courts as a 
sufficient exposition of the FDA’s view. 
91 Daniel E. Troy, The Case for FDA Preemption, in FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION, supra note 19, at 81, 100 (“One advantage of the explicit 
preemption statement in the Physician Labeling Rule is that it may reduce the 
need for FDA to submit amicus briefs in the myriad of cases around the 
country.”). 
92 21 C.F.R. § 10.85 (d) (1) (2006). 
93 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
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to exempt state requirements from preemption.”94 In this vein, 
the Colacicco federal district court emphasized that “the Court 
has made clear that such preemptive intent may properly be 
communicated in amicus briefs as well as in ‘regulations, 
preambles, interpretive statements and responses to 
comments.’”95 This position, however, has been countered on 
administrative law grounds by courts that take the position that 
amicus briefs and preambles lack the requisite “force of law” to 
merit Chevron deference.96
Colacicco is an exemplar of deference to the agency position 
on preemption. Colacicco followed the path set by two earlier 
(pre-preamble) Texas federal district court cases (Needleman v. 
Pfizer97 and Dusek v. Pfizer98), which deferred to the FDA’s 
94 Id. at 506 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 
U.S. 707, 718 (1985)). 
95 Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525 (E.D. Pa. 
2006), appeal docketed, No. 06-3107 (3d Cir. 2006). 
96 See, e.g., Weiss v. Fujisawa Pharm. Co., 464 F. Supp.2d 666, 673 
(E.D. Ky. 2006) (“[T]he preamble . . . is not entitled to Chevron deference,” 
because advisory opinions—which include “any portion of a Federal Register 
notice other than the text of a proposed or final regulation”—lack the force of 
law). As I have remarked elsewhere: 
The confusion stems largely from the ad hoc handling of 
deference in the relevant Supreme Court products liability 
preemption precedents, which . . . suggests some intermediate, 
if uncertain level of deference. . . . [A]lthough [United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)] would appear to preclude 
Chevron deference for both preambles and amicus briefs because 
they lack force of law, Justice Breyer’s [Barnhart v. Walton, 
535 U.S. 212 (2002)] factors may open the door to greater 
deference, even if courts are not willing to abandon traditional 
deference analysis and rely solely on preemption doctrine. 
Sharkey, supra note 58, at 43. 
97 2004 WL 1773697, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2004) (“[T]he Court 
places weight on the FDA’s unambiguous statement that it would view any 
statement describing a relationship between Zoloft use and suicide as ‘false 
and misleading,’ and it would deem any state warning requirement 
preempted.”). 
98 2004 WL 2191804, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2004) (“The Court 
concludes that the FDA’s position as stated in the amicus brief that any label 
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position on the ground that “Supreme Court precedent dictates 
that the FDA’s position as stated in its amicus brief is entitled to 
some deference.”99 Recall that the Colacicco court termed the 
FDA’s view—as embodied in the preamble as well as amicus 
brief—“critical” to the court’s analysis “because Supreme Court 
precedent dictates that an agency’s interpretation of the statute 
and regulations it administers is entitled to deference.”100
In the post-preamble period, a California federal district 
court (In re: Bextra and Celebrex) staked out an equally 
accommodating stance, setting a fairly low “reasonableness” bar 
for deference to agency view: 
[T]he FDA’s view of the preemptive effect of its own 
regulations is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation.” Its preemption position is 
premised on its assertion “the determination whether 
labeling revisions are necessary is, in the end, 
squarely and solely the FDA’s under the act.”101
suggesting that Zoloft can cause suicide would be false or misleading 
provides support for preemption.”). 
99 Id. 
100 Colacicco, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). 
101 In re: Bextra and Celebrex Marketing Sales Practices and Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 2006 WL 2374742, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006) (citations 
omitted). The court elaborated further: “The FDA explains that while a 
manufacturer can distribute a unilaterally strengthened label after giving the 
FDA prior notice, the FDA retains authority to disapprove the label. The 
FDA’s opinion is reasonable.” Id. 
 A California state court followed suit, relying heavily on the federal 
court’s reasoning. See Conte v. Wyeth, 2006 WL 2692469, at *6 (Cal. App. 
Dep’t Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 2006) (“The circumstances of this case are 
sufficiently similar to those in Bextra and also Colacicco v. Apotex Inc. to 
warrant granting summary judgment. The cases are similar insofar as their 
resolution turns on whether the recently promulgated FDA Preamble 
preempts State law ‘failure to warn’ claims. Since the Court finds the 
reasoning of the two cases very persuasive, and in light of Dowhal v. 
SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare [88 P.3d 1, 929-30 (Cal. 2004), 
which deferred to the FDA’s views “[b]ecause of the FDA’s scientific 
expertise and long administrative experience”], the Court grants summary 
judgment . . . .”). A second post-preamble state court case likewise placed 
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This highly deferential view stands in marked contrast to that of 
the state courts in Doherty v. Merck and Levine v. Wyeth, each 
of which refused to pay any heed whatsoever to the FDA’s pro-
preemption view as embodied in the preamble. 
Another striking distinction between federal and state courts 
is the way each has viewed the extent to which the FDA has 
changed its preemption position over time. In In re: Bextra and 
Celebrex, the California federal district court adopted an 
accommodating stance:  
While the FDA’s current view of the preemptive 
effect of its labeling regulations is a 180-degree 
reversal of its prior position, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that an agency’s view of the preemptive 
effect of its regulations may change over time as the 
agency gains more experience with the 
interrelationship between its regulations and state 
laws.102
A Rhode Island state court in Coutu v. Tracy was far less 
forgiving, and held it against the FDA that its “interpretation of 
its role squarely conflicts with the FDA’s previous stance” on 
the ground that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has 
articulated its preference to discount federal agencies’ 
heavy reliance on deference to the FDA. See Abramowitz v. Cephalon, Inc., 
2006 WL 560639, at *3 (N.J. Super. Mar. 3, 2006) (“[I]t is the court’s 
opinion that pursuant to the newly released federal regulation, the FDA’s 
decision to approve the defendant’s label for Actiq would preempt a state 
claim for failure to warn.”). 
 As a first cut in this Essay I treat state courts as if they are all of a piece; 
it might, however, be fruitful to investigate state by state differences. For 
example, California or New Jersey state courts may prove themselves to be 
especially inclined toward the pro-preemption view. If so, an interesting 
further puzzle emerges, because these states reject the notion of deference to 
state agencies in the context of interpreting state law. See, e.g., Sunstein, 
supra note 38, at 2597 (“California courts reject the notion that agencies have 
been delegated authority to interpret statutes. Similarly, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court notes that ‘courts are in no way bound by the agency’s 
interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue.’”). 
102 2006 WL 2374742 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006), at *8 (citing 
Hillsborough and Chevron). 
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interpretations of their regulations where said interpretations 
‘contradict the agenc[ies’] own previous construction that [the] 
Court [has] adopted as authoritative.’”103
Finally, it is worth keeping in mind that deference to agency 
position does not necessarily yield (at least in this context) a 
pro-preemption outcome. In the Perry case, the FDA advised in 
its letter brief (also relied upon by the court in Weiss), that “it is 
not possible to decide as a matter of law whether liability on the 
plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claim would prevent the 
accomplishment of federal regulatory objectives.”104 Nor is it by 
any means the case that federal district courts have consistently 
deferred to the FDA’s position.105 Some have, like the Coutu 
state court case above, denigrated the FDA’s recent position as 
too inconsistent to warrant deference.106
Another key point of contention, emphasized by the 
Nebraska federal district court in Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc.,107 
focuses on the procedural infirmities of the promulgation of the 
preamble: “The FDA failed to comply with its requirements to 
103 Coutu v. Tracy, 2006 WL 1314261, at *4 (R.I. Super. May 11, 
2006) (citations omitted). 
104 Letter of the United States to Judge Dalzell, Perry v. Novartis 
Pharma. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (filed Oct. 12, 2006). 
105 See, e.g., Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726, 730 (D. 
Minn. 2005) (refusing to defer to the FDA’s position on the ground that 
“[t]he Court . . . declines to treat statements from a single FDA legal brief as 
declarations afforded the preemptive force of law.”); McNellis v. Pfizer, 
Inc., 2005 WL 3752269 (D. N.J. Dec. 29, 2005) (“This Court, however, 
declines to treat statements from the amicus legal briefs as declarations to be 
afforded the preemptive force of law.”), motion to vacate denied, 
interlocutory appeal granted, 2006 WL 2819046 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006) 
(“[T]his Court, as it did in its December 29 Opinion with respect to legal 
positions taken by the FDA in amicus briefs, declines to give the Preamble 
preemptive force of law”); appeal docketed, No. 06-5148 (3d Cir. 2006). 
106 See, e.g., Weiss v. Fujisawa Pharm. Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d 666, 674 
(E.D. Ky. 2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court has also held that ‘the consistency 
of an agency’s position is a factor in assessing the weight that position is 
due.’ FDA’s position has not been consistent and is therefore entitled only to 
[weaker “power to persuade” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 
(1944)] deference.”) (internal citations omitted). 
107 432 F. Supp. 2d 964 (D. Neb. 2006). 
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communicate with the states and to allow the states an 
opportunity to participate in the proceedings prior to a 
preemption decision.”108 The court likewise declined to give 
either the amicus briefs filed by the FDA in prior Zoloft cases 
or the amicus brief in Colacicco “force of law.”109
While, as of yet, no stark outcome-based distinction between 
state and federal courts has emerged,110 there is, nonetheless, a 
discernible difference in flavor in the character of the opinions, 
which relates to the priority accorded to the FDA’s views. State 
108 Id. at 968 n.3 (citing Executive Order 13132). Other federal district 
courts have followed suit, with little in the way of additional analysis. See 
Reeves v. Wyeth, No. 05-163, at 1 (E.D. Ark. June 15, 2006) (“I have 
reviewed Judge Bataillon’s erudite order in Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc, et al., and 
adopt his reasoning in its entirety—it is a mule-and-bicycle case.”). Three 
additional “anti-preemption” federal district courts contain nary a mention of 
deference to the FDA’s position (as embodied in amicus briefs or the 
preamble). See Laisure-Radke v. Par Pharm., Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1163 
(W.D. Wash. 2006); Peters v. Astrazeneca, LP, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1051 
(W.D. Wis. 2006); Baumgardner v. Wyeth Pharms., No. 05-05720, 2006 
WL 1308232 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2006). 
109 Jackson, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 969 n.4. Wyeth and Pfizer filed motions 
for certification of interlocutory appeal. Memorandum in Support of Wyeth 
Defendants’ Motion for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal, 2006 WL 
1887007 (D. Neb. June 9, 2006); Defendant Pfizer, Inc.’s Brief in Support of 
Motion for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal, 2006 WL 1887002 (D. 
Neb. June 13, 2006). The case settled in August 2006. See Notice of 
Settlement, No. 8:05CV18-88 (filed Aug. 7, 2006). 
110 In the sample of cases listed in the Appendix (setting to one side the 
five cases that either settled or were withdrawn or decided on other grounds), 
federal courts have deferred to the agency’s position in seven out of 
seventeen drug labeling claims since 2000, while state courts have preempted 
claims in three out of seven cases. Federal courts have thus been 2 percent 
less likely to defer to the agency’s position—a statistically insignificant 
difference that affirms a finding of parity. The result does not change if only 
those cases that follow the announcement of the preamble are used in the 
analysis. Among post-preamble cases, federal courts have deferred to the 
agency’s position in four out of ten decisions, whereas state courts have 
preempted two out of four cases—a result likewise of near parity, with 
federal and state courts deferring to the agency’s position at rates of 40 
percent and 50 percent, respectively. More than the usual cautionary caveat 
applies here, however, where the post-preamble sample size is so small. 
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courts are far less likely than federal courts to wrestle in any 
serious way with the rich case law that has emerged surrounding 
the FDA’s position on preemption, including the complicated 
administrative law underpinnings.111
CONCLUSION: FEDERALISM IMPLICATIONS 
The ambitions of this Essay necessarily exceed its scope. 
Having scratched the surface of what promises to be a fruitful 
area of further study—state versus federal court differences in 
realms of statutory interpretation—and having posited some 
potential explanatory variables to explore, I close with a few 
thoughts on the wide-ranging federalism implications of such an 
inquiry. 
Forum allocation decisions clearly implicate federalism 
concerns. First, should federal forums prove more sympathetic 
than their state counterparts to preemption arguments—
particularly those premised upon the stated preemption positions 
of federal agencies—and should outcome-determinative 
distinctions emerge over time, plaintiffs will have an added 
incentive to bring cases in state court and forcefully to resist 
removal to federal court.112
111 It is striking, for example, that Levine v. Wyeth, _ A.2d _, 2006 WL 
3041078 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2006), is the only state court case in the sample 
surveyed that even cites Chevron or Mead, whereas it is the rare federal 
court case that neglects their mention. Cf. Anderson, supra note 76, at 1020 
(“The United States v. Mead Corp., Barnhart v. Walton, and Christensen v. 
Harris County refinements are known by some state courts, but do not seem 
to play a serious role in outcomes.”). 
112 In the sample surveyed here, four of the cases were successfully 
removed from state to federal court. Weiss v. Fujisawa Pharm. Co., 464 F. 
Supp. 2d 666 (E.D. Ky. 2006); McNellis v. Pfizer Inc., 2005 WL 3752269, 
at *1 (D. N.J. Dec. 29, 2005), motion to vacate denied, interlocutory appeal 
granted, 2006 WL 2819046 (D. N.J. Sept. 29, 2006), appeal docketed, No. 
06-8056 (3d Cir. 2006); Needleman v. Pfizer Inc., 2004 WL 1773697 (N.D. 
Tex. Aug. 6, 2004); Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1086 
(C.D. Cal. 2000). 
 While it is way too soon to tell, post-FDA preamble, we may be 
witnessing an increase in state pharmaceutical cases. In the year since the 
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Second, and perhaps less readily apparent, the subject of this 
Essay has implications for the debate over whether courts should 
accord Chevron deference to federal agencies’ preemption 
positions, as enshrined in amicus briefs, preambles, or formal 
rules and regulations. In addition to the reluctance (explored 
above) of state courts to seek out, and accord respect to, the 
views of the relevant federal agency, the Supreme Court would 
undoubtedly face a tall task in terms of enforcing a Chevron 
regime in products cases, given the sheer number of cases that 
come up through the diverse state jurisdictions. 
This leads to a final parting thought relating to federal 
jurisdiction. To the extent that Grable & Sons Metal Products, 
Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing113 opened the door 
to federal question “arising under” jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 
1331) over federal issues embedded in state-law claims between 
nondiverse parties,114 a reluctance on the part of state courts to 
consider, yet alone defer to, the views of the relevant federal 
agencies when interpreting federal statutes might strengthen the 
claim that these preemption determinations implicate “a serious 
federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent 
in a federal forum.”115
publication of the preamble, there have been four state cases decided, as 
compared to three state cases decided in the six years prior to the preamble. 
113 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
114 This was a door presumed closed by courts and commentators who 
read Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), as 
effectively limiting federal jurisdiction to express and implied federal causes 
of action. Id. (holding that a state-law negligence per se claim, based upon a 
violation of the FDCA, did not present a sufficient federal ingredient to 
justify federal question jurisdiction). See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 
2, at 1413-14, 1428-31 (arguing that “Grable has reinvigorated federal 
question jurisdiction” and proposing an extension of “arising under” 
jurisdiction for cases “when both the underlying standard of tort liability is 
predicated on federal law and the potential for punitive damages threatens to 
spill across a state’s borders” as “consistent with the flexible standard 
employed by the Court in ‘exploring the outer reaches of § 1331.’”). 
115 Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. On the other hand, the countervailing 
concern with respect to the “potentially enormous shift of traditionally state 
cases into federal courts” would persist. Id. at 319. See also Empire 
HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 126 S. Ct. 2121, 2137 (2006) 
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Much more than first meets the eye may be involved in 
whether pharmaceutical products cases are tried in state versus 
federal court. 
(“Grable emphasized that it takes more than a federal element ‘to open the 
“arising under” door.’”). 
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